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"The strongest presumption of the law is the presumption of
legitimacy."!
"No human bond is cemented with greater strength than that of
parent and child."2
I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law, a man had no duty to support his illegitimate
child. 3 While the law required a father to provide for his legitimate
issue, it regarded an illegitimate child as filius nullius, "the child of no
one."4 Over time, the common law was gradually supplanted by stat
utes enacted to provide for adjudication of paternity.s
Legislatures passed such statutes in order to enable mothers to
compel putative fathers to appear in court to prove that these errant
men were the fathers of their illegitimate children and therefore re
sponsible for child support. 6 The legislatures, and indeed society, ap
1. Thompson v. Nichols, 286 A.D. 810, 810, 141 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1955) (where
mother and husband were living in the same apartment at the times of conception and birth
of a child, evidence of paternity in another man was not sufficient to overcome the strongest
presumption of the law, the presumption of legitimacy); Burnes v. Burnes, 60 Misc. 2d 675,
676,303 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1969) (because presumption ofiegitimacy is one of the strong
est presumptions of law, a married woman's action to have a man other than her husband
declared the father of her child must be adjourned to permit notice to the mother's hus
band, the presumed father).
2. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 216 Cal. Rptr. 748,749,703 P.2d 88, 89 (1985) (where
the mother and husband were divorced and mother subsequently married the man who
claimed to be the natural father of the child, born during her earlier marriage, the presump
tion of paternity in the man who was the mother's husband at the time of birth was not
overcome), appeal dismissed, Michelle Marie W. v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986).
3. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.1,
at 155 (1968); G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW § 3.7, at 143
(1979); H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971).
4. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 155; H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 3-5.
5. For examples of such statutes, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) (originally
enacted as Stats. 1921 c. 136, p. 137, § 1 (1921); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1354 (Smith
Hurd 1980) (originally enacted as Family Court Act of 1899); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT 5
§ 522 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amending N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT. ACT § 62 (McKinney
1930) and N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1925»; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-435 (West 1960) (originally enacted as Gen. Assembly Public Statute Laws, Stat. 92, tit.
8, § 1-3, (1672) appearing in Stat. 92 Title 8 § 1-3 Fn3, General Assembly Public Statute
Laws, May Session 1821) (repealed 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 71 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1985) (originally enacted as Compo Laws Dak. § 5560 (1887».
6. In Commonwealth v. Domes, 239 Mass. 592, 132 N.E. 363 (1921), the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court explained the purpose of the Massachusetts statute:
. . . [T]he purpose of our bastardy laws is to secure the municipality or state
against any loss or expense for the child's maintenance. . . . It is true that his
torically legislation of this character is connected with the system of poor relief;
there being no legal obligation on the putative father to support his illegitimate
child at common law. . . . Apparently the main object of such legislation has
been to provide security for the town liable to support the bastard child. This was
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parently never contemplated that a day would come when men
themselves would seek to establish paternity, when a man would want
to compel a woman into court to prove that he was the father of the
woman's child. Today, after more than two decades of profound
changes in social attitudes toward sex roles, which have included a
new appreciation of men as parents and nurturers, that day has come.
In the recent Massachusetts case of P.B. C. v. D.H., after a di
vorced woman had given birth to a child, the man with whom the
woman had had a sexual relationship prior to her pregnancy and di
vorce sought a judicial determination that he was the father of the
child. 7 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, relying on the
deeply entrenched common law presumption that the husband of a
married woman is the father of her child, 8 dismissed the putative fa
ther's9 suit.1O The court held that as a stranger to the marriage the
putative father had no right to attempt to rebut the presumption of
paternity in the mother's husband. I I
This note will examine a putative father's right to prove paternity
in the context both of the supreme judicial court's decision in P.B. C.
and the existing common law and statutory remedies available to puta
tive fathers in Massachusetts. Part II of the note will both set out the
facts of P.B. C. and analyze the court's holding and reasoning in that
emphasized after St. 1859, c. 239, gave substantial control of the litigation to the
overseers of the poor in the town of the complainant's residence. But both before
and after that statute was enacted, another recognized purpose was to compel the
putative father to aid the mother in the support of the child.
Id. at 593-94, 132 N.E. at 364.
7. P.B.C. v. D.H., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. 68,483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1286 (1986).
8. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 156 (discussion of the history of this presumption).
Clark explains that at English common law
[a] strong presumption [existed] that the child born to a married woman was
legitimate. . . . [A]t one point in English legal history it could be rebutted only
by proof that the mother's husband was impotent or out of England. In the color
ful legal phrase he had to be proved to be 'beyond the four seas.' The presump
tion survives in our law . . . .
See also Commonwealth v. Leary, 345 Mass. 59,185 N.E.2d 641 (1962) (the legal presump
tion always is that a child born in lawful wedlock is legitimate, but such presumption may
be rebutted by facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the mother's husband
could not have been the father of her child); P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d
at 1096.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979) defines putative father as "the
alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." The term "putative father," as used in
this note, shall refer to a man who has asserted his biological paternity of a child, but who
has not been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child.
10. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1095, 1098-99.
11. Id. at 71-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
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case. Part III will assess how M~ssachusetts law affects a putative
father's guarantee of equal protection under the fourteenth amend
ment to the United States Constitution. 12 In this section the note will
demonstrate how Massachusetts classifies putative fathers in a way
that burdens their right to establish a paternal relationship.13 Part IV
of the note will argue that that right is a fundamental right. Part V
will apply a strict scrutiny analysis to illustrate how Massachusetts
law violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu
tion. In Part VI the note will argue, in the alternative, that if the right
of fathers to establish a parent-child relationship is not a fundamental
right, the Massachusetts scheme nonetheless fails under a less rigorous
rational basis analysis. The note concludes that under the equal pro
tection clause of the United States Constitution, Massachusetts law
impermissibly burdens a putative father's right to prove his paternity
of his child.
II.

FACTS

P.B. C. involved a paternity suit brought under the equity jurisdic

tion of the probate and family court14 by a man unmarried to the
12. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. By right to establish a paternal relationship, this note refers to the right of a man
to have access to the courts to prove his biological paternity. The mere establishment of
that relationship is the right denied to the plaintiff in P.B. C. and it is, therefore, that bare
right that is the focus of this note. Of course, from that adjudication of paternity may flow
other rights, such as custody and visitation, if the granting of such rights is found to be
consistent with the child's best interests. See infra note 143.
14. Chapter 215, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides for the eq
uity jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court:
The probate and family court department shall have original and concurrent ju
risdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior court department of
all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity
jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be courts of general equity
jurisdiction. . . .
In Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 434 N.E.2d 631 (1982), where a putative father
invoked this equity jurisdiction, the supreme judicial court explained that
[w]here a man is acknowledged to be the father of an illegitimate child, the Pro
bate Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 215, § 6, first par. (conferring equity
jurisdiction), to make judgments concerning the father's visitation rights. . . .
[W]here the plaintiff's paternity is denied or questioned, the court has jurisdiction
to determine that issue, and, if paternity is established, to determine what, if any,
rights of visitation the plaintiff should have.
[d. at 851-53,434 N.E.2d at 632-33.
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child's mother. IS The mother of the child, who was the defendant in
the case, had given birth to the child the day after she was divorced
from her husband. 16 Plaintiff sought a decree that he, and not the
former husband, was the father of the child. 17
The child whose paternity was at issue in P.B. C. was conceived in
September 19811 8 and was born on June 10, 1982.19 The putative fa
ther and the mother agreed that they had engaged in a sexual relation
ship prior to September 1981 20 but disputed whether that relationship
continued during and after September 1981.2 1
In May 1981, five months before the child was conceived, the
mother filed a complaint for divorce from her husband. 22 The probate
and family court entered a judgment of divorce nisp3 in December
1981, and the divorce became final on June 9, 1982, the day before the
child's birth.24 On September 12, 1983, six days after the putative fa
ther filed suit for adjudication of paternity, the mother and her former
husband remarried. 2s The mother, her husband, an older child previ
ously born to them, and the child at the center of this controversy
continued to live together at the time of the supreme judicial court's
decision. 26
The child involved in the case has resided with the mother since
birth,27 and the husband, who is listed as the father on the child's birth
certificate, has not taken any legal steps to deny paternity.28 The puta
tive father's relationship with the child for the first fifteen months of
his life is unc1ear;29 however, beginning in September 1983, the mother
15. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
16. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
17. Id. at 68-69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
18. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Plaintiff claimed that the sexual relationship between he and the defendant con
tinued during September, October, and November, 1981. Defendant asserted that their
sexual activity had ceased prior to September. Id. at 70 n.l, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 n.1.
22. Id.
23. Divorce nisi is an interim judgment of divorce. The supreme judicial court has
explained that "[A] judgment nisi is a judgment of divorce . . . a couple is not divorced
until the judgment becomes absolute ... [t]hus, a second marriage contracted during the
interval between the judgment nisi and the judgment absolute is void." Ross v. Ross, 385
Mass. 30, 35, 430 N.E.2d 815, 819 (1982).
24. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 70-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
27. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
28. Id.
29. Because plaintilrs suit was dismissed before trial, the court made no findings as
to the putative father's relationship to the child during his first fifteen months of life. The

234

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:229

denied him visitation or other access to the child. 30 That denial
prompted the putative father to file suit in probate court to have him
self declared the father of the child.
The putative father moved for a court order that he, the mother,
and the child submit to a Human Leukocyte Antigen white blood cell
test. 31 Upon a denial of this motion, the putative father instituted pro
ceedings in the appeals court and before a single justice of the supreme
judicial court, and an order for the requested test on a specified date
was issued. 32
The mother and child failed to submit to the test, however, and
the trial court imposed sanctions that would have had the effect of the
plaintiff's attorney explained that the mother had approached P.B.C. when the child was
born, asserting that he was the baby's father and requesting financial assistance as well as
help in caring for the child. The plaintiff then supplied his home with baby-care furniture
and equipment, including a crib, and cared for the child during the week while the mother
worked at an evening shift job. The plaintiff also made payments on a home in which the
mother and child lived. Telephone interview with Muriel Carpenter, attorney for the plain
tiff in P.D.C., (December 6, 1985).
The defendant's attorney, on the other hand, explained that his client denied that the
plaintiff was the father of the child. Although defendant admitted that she had had an
affair with the plaintiff, she maintained that she had terminated that involvement prior to
the child's birth. She further denied that the plaintiff provided housing for herself and the
baby, and instead asserted that she merely rented an apartment in a house which he owned.
Telephone interview with Steven Dean, attorney for the defendant in P.D.C., (January 7,
1986).
30. P.D.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
31. Id. at 69,483 N.E.2d at 1095. The Massachusetts legislature has recognized the
reliability and accuracy of blood tests as a method of determining paternity. Chapter 273,
section 12A of the Massachusetts General Laws provides for the court to order blood tests
in paternity proceedings:
In any proceeding to determine the question of paternity, the court, on the mo
tion of the alleged father, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father
to submit to one or more blood grouping tests, to be made by a duly qualified
physician or other duly qualified person, designated by the court, to determine
whether or not the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child.
The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where defi
nite exclusion of the alleged father as such father has been established. If one of
the parties refuses to comply with the order of the court relative to such tests,
such fact shall be admissible in evidence in such proceeding unless the court, for
good cause, otherwise orders.
See Commonwealth v. Blazo, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 324,406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980) (in view of
the high level of accuracy attained from human leukocyte antigen white blood cell test and
the recognition and acceptance of the test by the scientific and medical communities, order
for such test should be seriously considered in a paternity proceeding).
32. P.D.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 69, 483 N.E.2d at 1095. The opinion is unclear
about whether the order for the blood test was issued by the trial court, the appeals court,
or the supreme judicial court: "there were proceedings in the Appeals Court and before a
single justice of this court, as well as further proceedings in the trial court, resulting in the
allowance of the plaintifrs motion." Id.
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mother's making concessions favorable to the putative father's claim. 33
When the putative father moved that the case be scheduled for trial,
the mother responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
putative father could not litigate the issue of paternity.34 The trial
court denied this motion, and ordered that noncompliance with the
order for the blood test would result in the mother's incarceration,
assessment of daily costs against her, and preclusion of her offering
evidence on the issue of paternity.35
The mother then petitioned the appeals court for review of the
denial of her motion to dismiss the putative father's complaint. 36 A
single justice of the appeals court authorized an interlocutory appeal
to the appeals court from the denial of her motion to dismiss and
stayed the proceedings in the trial court. 37 The supreme judicial court
transferred the case on its own initiative. 38
Pointing to dual policies of avoiding illegitimacy and protecting
family life, the supreme judicial court granted the mother's motion to
dismiss. 39 The court cited the firmly established rule that a child born
to a married woman is presumed to be the child of her husband,40 and
then, because the mother was not married but divorced at the time the
child was born, extended that presumption to include a child conceived
by a married woman. 41 While acknowledging that the presumption of
legitimacy could be rebutted by a mother or her husband,42 the court
held that the presumption was irrebuttable by a putative father.43
Plaintiff was therefore not allowed to introduce any evidence to prove
that he was the father of the child, and the court refused to hear his
claim for paternity adjudication. 44
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 69-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
38. Id. at 70, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
39. Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
40. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
41. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
42. Id. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. See also Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540,
544,432 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1982), stating that "[t]he Legislature has authorized a husband
and a wife to testify in a nonsupport action concerning the parentage of a child (G. L. c.273
§ 7) and has allowed a mother, although married, to testify in an illegitimacy proceeding
that a man other than her husband is the father of her child."}.
43. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
44. After this decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court which denied
certiorari on March 3, 1986. P.B.C. v. D.H., 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986).
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THE CLASSIFICATION OF PARENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS

The Supreme Court of the United States has read the equal pro
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con
stitution to require that, at a minimum, a governmental classification
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 45 Where a classifica
tion affects a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class, however, a
court subjects it to strict judicial scrutiny and must determine that it is
the narrowest way to achieve a compelling state end. 46
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in P.B. C,
read against the backdrop of the statutory and common law rules re
garding paternity in Massachusetts,47 operates to classify men as
either presumed or putative fathers 48 and, in so doing, to deny putative
fathers the right to prove that they are the fathers of their children. 49
That right, implicating a core relationship between parent and child, is
a fundamental right. 50
Massachusetts paternity law views married men as the presumed
fathers of children born to their wives. 51 That same presumption op
erates to render an unmarried putative father's ability to prove that he
is the biological father of a married woman's child difficult, if not im
possible.52 The putative father does not enjoy the benefit of a pre
sumption of paternity, and if the mother of the child is married, he
must rebut the presumption of paternity in her husband. As the note
will demonstrate, the legal avenues available to a Massachusetts puta
tive father to establish his paternity of a married woman's child are
quite limited.
The effect of Massachusetts paternity law is to classify fathers and
45. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55
(1985), the Court stated that the general rule regarding the validity of state legislation
under equal protection is that such validity is presumed and the law will be sustained if the
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When economic legislation
is at issue, the Court has generally shown a deferrential attitude. See, e.g., Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
46. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
47. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying text.
48. Although mothers constitute another class of parents, a full discussion of the
rights and duties of mothers, is outside the scope of this note. For a discussion of maternal
rights see H. CLARK, supra note 3, § 5.4, at 176-77; G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED
COUPLES AND THE LAW § 3.6, at 138 (1979); H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 28-29.
49. See infra notes 66·96 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 101-166 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 66·96 and accompanying text.
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then to give more rights to presumed than to putative fathers. Such a
classification triggers the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 53
Massachusetts' interest in the classification is three-fold: (1) to
make children legitimate wherever possible; (2) to protect traditional
family units; and (3) to ensure the care and support of children. 54 The
state classification system affords legitimacy to the greatest number of
children through its preference that paternity reside in married rather
than unmarried men. It protects traditional family units by erecting
barriers to an unmarried, putative father's ability to disrupt an intact
family unit through his attempts to prove that he is the father of a
child conceived or born during the marriage. Finally, the state classifi
cation system ensures the care and support of children by guarantee
ing that at least one man will be presumed to be the legal father of a
child.
This section of the note will examine the classification of parents
in Massachusetts, whereby putative fathers are granted rights inferior
to presumed fathers. In the next section the note will demonstrate
how the right burdened by the classification, the right of a man to
establish a parent-child relationship, is a fundamental right.
A.

The Rights of Married Fathers

The law presumes a man to be the father of a child born to his
wife. 55 No legal proceedings are required to establish a husband's pa
ternity; the presumption of legitimacy operates automatically to make
53. The Equal Protection Clause is triggered by a classification that operates to dis
tinguish between groups of persons who are similarly situated, and then gives more rights
to one group than to another. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives only to unmarried persons violates
equal protection). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to males under 21 and to females under 18 violates equal protection); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the
wrongful death of their mother while permitting recovery for legitimate children in the
same circumstance violates equal protection). For a general discussion of classifications
triggering equal protection see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586-686 (11th ed.
1985).
54. In P.B.C the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stressed the primacy of
these interests. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1099.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In P.B.C the court expressly stated
this presumption, and then declared that the "presumption of legitimacy may not be rebut
ted, even in a civil case, 'except on facts which prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the
husband could not have been the father.''' P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d
at 1096 (quoting Phillips v. Allen, 2 Allen 453, 454 (1861». See also Sayles v. Sayles, 323
Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948) (mere proof of the wife's adultery while cohabiting with her
husband is not sufficient to overcome presumption of legitimacy).
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the husband of the mother the legally recognized father of a child born
to her.56 The husband, accordingly, is both responsible for the child's
support and entitled to constitutional protection of the resulting par
ent-child relationship. 57
This presumption of legitimacy has its roots in the societal and
religious condemnation of out-of-wedlock sexual activity, condemna
tion which was visited on the child born of such activity as well as on
the parents. The plight of the "bastard" child centuries ago provided
56. Because of the strength of the presumption, a husband is legally the father of any
child born to his wife unless and until the presumption has been formally rebutted. See
supra note 8. Thus, an unmarried man must establish that he is the father of a child, while
a married man must establish that he is not.
57. A father's duty to support his children derives from chapter 273 section 1 of the
Massachusetts General Laws which makes desertion and nonsupport a crime, providing in
part that:
Any spouse or parent who without just cause deserts his spouse or minor child,
whether by going into another town in the commonwealth or into another state,
and leaves them or any or either of them without making reasonable provision for
their support, and any spouse or parent who unreasonably neglects or refuses to
provide for the support and maintenance of his spouse, whether living with him
or living apart from him for justifiable cause, or of his minor child, and any
spouse or parent who abandons or leaves his spouse or minor child in danger of
becoming a burden upon the public and any parent of a minor child or any guard
ian with care and custody of a minor child, or any custodian of a minor child,
who willfully fails to provide necessary and proper physical, educational or moral
care and guidance, or who permits said child to grow up under conditions or
circumstances damaging to the child's sound character development, or who fails
to provide proper attention for said child, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both.
See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (parents are natural
guardians of their children with legal as well as moral obligation to support, educate, and
care for their children's development and well-being, and, as such, it is parents who have
the primary right to raise their children as they see fit); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359
Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971) (the law gives parents custody and right of control over
their children, including power to exercise whatever authority is reasonably necessary for
that purpose to enable them to discharge their obligation to support, provide for and pro
tect their children and to provide educational guidance); Commonwealth v. Zarrilli, 5
Mass. App. Ct. 518, 364 N.E.2d 1089 (1977) (husband has a duty to support his wife and
minor children).
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a parent-child relationship is enti
tled to constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when
appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.' "
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring»; Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").

1986]

PUTATIVE FATHERS

239

the impetus for the presumption of legitimacy. 58 By preventing mar
ried couples from bastardizing their own issue, even where adultery
may have occurred, the law minimized the number of illegitimate chil
dren. Two factors were at work. First, the harsh treatment of illegiti
mates provided motivation for the law to operate so as to avoid
attaching illegitimate status to innocent children whenever possible. 59
Second, the lack of any method of determining paternity as conclusive
as modern blood testing was a logical reason for presuming paternity
in a husband. 60
A hypothetical situation illustrates the operation of the presump
tion of legitimacy. If a married woman (W) conceives a child (C), her
husband (H) is presumed to be the father of that child. That presump
tion applies whether or not H is indeed C's biological father,61 whether
or not Hand W were divorced at the time of C's birth,62 whether or
not they subsequently divorce,63 and even whether or not H has any
relationship with or emotional tie to C whatsoever.64 For example, if
during the pregnancy Hand W divorce, W alone moves to a distant
city, gives birth there, and the ex-husband does not ever see or even
58. H. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 155-56,172; H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 1-7. See
also Note, Recent Decisions-Domestic Relations, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 129 (1970).
59. H. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 172.
60. H. KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 123.
61. This, of course, is the issue in P.B. C. Because the court presumed the mother's
husband to be the father of her child and wished to shield the marriage from paternity suits
brought by outsiders, the court refused to inquire into the actual biological paternity of the
child by means of a blood test. Some courts have refused to relieve husbands from a pre
sumed fatherhood status even in the presence of evidence which clearly establishes that
biological paternity does not lie in the husband. See. e.g., Cook v. Perron, 427 So. 2d 499
(La. Ct. App. 1983) (husband precluded from disavowing child notwithstanding blood tests
conclusively showing that he could not have been the biological father of the child); People
v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1979) (husband is deemed legal
father of and is responsible for his wife's child if it is conceived while they are cohabiting,
and the issue of biological paternity is irrelevant); Hess v. Whitsett, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552,
65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967) (racial differences do not overcome the presumption of legitimacy;
where white wife was married to white husband but gave birth to a Negro/white mixed
race child, husband still held to be the father of the child).
62. In P.B.C., the husband and wife were divorced at the time of the child's birth.
1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096. See also Cartee v. Carswell, 425 So. 2d
204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (a child born after a divorce but conceived during marriage
is presumed legitimate and thus the ex-husband is presumed to be the father).
63. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096; Michelle W. v. Ronald
W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985) (presumption oflegitimacy not
overcome even when mother remarries after divorce), appeal dismissed, Michelle Marie W.
v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986).
64. See Lirette v. Lirette, 430 So. 2d 1150 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (former husband was
presumed to be the father of child born to his former wife, even though she committed
adultery and then concealed her pregnancy and the fact of the child's birth from him).
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meet the child, the law would nevertheless presume him to be the fa
ther of that child.65
B.

The Rights of Putative Fathers

In contrast to a married man, a putative father is not presumed to
be the father of a child. A putative father must affirmatively establish
his paternity, rather than merely relying. on the operation of a
presumption.
This section of the note will describe the ways in which putative
fathers in Massachusetts may establish paternity and will show how
the circumstance of the mother's marriage and the resulting presump
tion of legitimacy preclude the putative father from access to any of
the state-provided alternatives.

1.

Marriage to the Child's Mother

The first way in which a putative father can establish paternity of
his child is to marry the child's mother. If the marriage takes place
prior to the birth of the child, the presumption of legitimacy operates
to make the husband the presumed father of the child born to his wife,
whether or not the couple was married at the time the child was
conceived. 66
Marriage to the mother, without more, is not sufficient to estab
lish paternity in Massachusetts when the marriage takes place after the
child is born.67 If the new husband does not acknowledge68 the child
as his own, then paternity is neither established nor presumed solely
by virtue of the marriage, and a stepfather-stepchild relationship ex
ists. If, however, marriage is accompanied by the new husband's ac
knowledgment of his paternity of his wife's child, then Massachusetts
law recognizes the husband as the child's father.69
The problem with this method of securing parental rights is two
fold. First, even if the putative father is willing to marry the child's
mother, she may already be married, or she may not be willing to
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1958) (amended by ch. 190, § 7
(West Supp. 1986». In 1929, the Massachusetts Attorney-General addressed the question
whether "the subsequent marriage of the parents of a child born out of wedlock has the
effect of legitimating their child." The Attorney-General advised that acknowledgement by
the father was "requisite in addition to intermarriage to legitimate a child born out of
wedlock." 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 355 (1927).
68. See infra note 72.
69. See infra note 72.
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marry him. In these situations, whether or not the putative father will
be able to establish a parent-child relationship will depend wholly on
the status and will of the mother. The United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged that this method of securing a parent-child relation
ship, depending as it does on the will of the mother, is not within the
putative father's controPo It is not, therefore, a particularly effective
remedy for the putative father.
Second, even if the mother marries the putative father after the
child's birth, if she was married to another man at the time of the
child's conception or birth, then the presumption of paternity rests
with the former husband. That presumption would not be voided by
the mother's later marriage to the third party.7 1 In other words, mar
riage to the mother will transform a putative father into a presumed
father only if the mother was not married to anyone else at the time
the child was conceived or born.
In the situation of the putative father in P.B. C, the defendant
mother was divorced at the time of the child's birth, and marriage
between her and the putative father was thus theoretically possible.
Even if both parties had agreed to the union, however, it would not
have achieved the goal of establishing the putative father's paternity,
because the presumption of paternity would have remained with the
ex-husband.
Thus, where the parties are unable or unwilling to marry, or
where the presumption of legitimacy has already named the mother's
former husband as the child's father, this method of establishing pater
nity fails.
2.

Acknowledgment of the Child

The second way in which a putative father may establish pater
nity of his child is to "acknowledge" the child as his.72 Massachusetts
70. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983).
71. Michelle w., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748.
72. Massachusetts courts have uniformly held that acknowledgment of a child con
fers legitimacy on that child. See, e.g., MacIntyre v. Cregg, 350 Mass. 22, 212 N.E.2d 860
(1965) (child born illegitimate whose parents later intermarried and whose father acknowl
edged him as his became legitimate under chapter 190, section 7 of the Massachusetts
General Laws even though the child's birth record was not amended under chapter 46,
section 13 of the Massachusetts General Laws); Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 405
N.E.2d 135 (1980) (requirement of intermarriage to legitimate a child under chapter 190,
§ 7 is unconstitutional; statutory requirement of acknowledgment and/or adjudication of
paternity is constitutional). The fact of the child's legitimacy neccessarily implies that the
putative father is now presumed to be the actual father of the child. See Houghton v.
Dickinson, 196 Mass. 389, 392, 82 N.E. 481, 482 (1907) (lawful legitimation creates the
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formerly required both intermarriage of the parents and acknowledg
ment by the father to legitimate a child. 73 The intermarriage require
ment was judicially abolished in 1980,74 however, and
acknowledgment by the father is now sufficient in itself to confer legiti
macy on a child and establish paternity in the acknowledging father.75
The statute providing for legitimation does not define acknowl
legal relation of parent and child). See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of the meaning of "acknowledgment."
73. The statute as it appeared before 1980 provided in pertinent part:
An illegitimate person whose parents have intermarried and whose father has
acknowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father under chapter two
hundred and seventy-three shall be deemed legitimate and shall be entitled to take
the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1958).
74. Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). Lowell was a
landmark decision ruling the intermarriage requirement in chapter 190, section 7 of the
Massachusetts General Laws unconstitutional. In Lowell, the plaintiff was an illegitimate
daughter born very shortly after the death of the putative father. Allyson Lowen sought a
declaratory judgment that she was in fact the child of the decedent unwed father and there
fore entitled to share in the distribution of his intestate estate. The decedent had never
married the child's mother nor had he ever been adjudicated the father. The probate court
held that the child was not entitled to share in the decedent's intestate estate because her
parents had never married, as required by statute.
The supreme judicial court found that the statute, as read, would mean that even
where a putative father had publicly and consistently acknowledged the child as his own,
the child would not be legitimate nor entitled to an intestate share of the father's estate
unless the parents had intermarried. Conceding that the state had a compelling interest in
avoiding fraudulent claims against the estate of a man who died intestate, the Lowell court
found no justification for denying the right of a child to inherit from his or her natural
father when paternity has been admitted. Accordingly, a child is legitimated under Massa
chusetts law either by an adjudication of paternity, chapter 273, section 12 of the Massa
chusetts General Laws Annotated or by a father's acknowledgment of his illegitimate child.
75. The Massachusetts legislature amended chapter 190, section 7 of the Massachu
setts General Laws Annotated after the Lowell decision. The statute now reads:
An illegitimate person whose parents have intermarried and whose father has
acknowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father under chapter two
hundred and seventy-three shall be deemed legitimate and shall be entitled to take
the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock. If a
decendent has acknowledged paternity of an illegitimate person or if during his
lifetime or after his death a decedent has been adjudged to be the father of an
illegitimate person, that person is heir of his father and of any person from whom
his father might have inherited, if living, and the descendents of an illegitimate
person shall represent that person and take by descent any estate which such
person would have taken, if living. A person may establish paternity if, within the
period provided under section nine of chapter one hundred and ninety-seven of
the General Laws for bringing actions against executors and administrators, such
person either [a] delivers to the executor or administrator an authenticated copy
of a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, an action in which
the executor or administrator is a named party and in which such paternity is
ultimately proved.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West Supp. 1986).
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edgment,76 but Massachusetts courts have construed the term to in
clude written statements of paternity, oral declarations, and conduct
that indicates an intent to acknowledge paternity.77 For example, in
Lowell v. Kowalski, an illegitimate daughter asserted her right to in
herit from her unwed father's intestate estate. 78 The court upheld that
right and found that the decedent's written acknowledgment of his
paternity of the child was sufficient to constitute acknowledgment and
legitimacy for the purpose of intestate succession. 79
In Wrenn v. Harris, the federal district court of Massachusetts
considered the claim of an illegitimate child for Social Security Act
survivor's benefits after the death of the child's natural father.80 The
court held that under Massachusetts law the decedent's statements of
his paternity to his sisters, co-workers, and members of the child's
mother's family, as well as statements he made in letters, constituted
acknowledgment of the child, who was therefore entitled to benefits.81
Finally, the Massachusetts appeals court has held in Higgins v. Ripley,
a case involving the rights of an illegitimate child to share in the intes
tate estate of the deceased unwed father, that the decedent father's
visits to the child, along with testimony of the child's mother, the
child's pediatrician, and a friend that the decedent had admitted pater
nity of the child, were sufficient to show that the decedent had ac
knowledged the child. 82
The difficulties presented by acknowledgment as a means by
which a putative father can establish paternal rights involve, once
76. In Wrenn v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1980), the district court ex
plained that "[w]hen it amended the statute, the legislature, presumably aware of the Low
ell decision, nevertheless passed up the opportunity to specify the permissible forms of
acknowledgement. Hence, the legislature apparently intended the courts to draw the pre
cise contours of the statutory requirement." Id. at 225.
77. In addition to this type of acknowledgement by behavior, Massachusetts pro
vides for a specialized form of acknowledgement by oath to be used only in the context of
non-support proceedings. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 273, § 15 provides that "[i]f [a
putative father] has sworn to and executed an acknowledgement of paternity which was
accompanied by a written affirmation of paternity sworn to and executed by the mother,
such acknowledgement shall be admissible as evidence. . . ." Besides being quite limited
in application, the statute poses great obstacles for the putative father seeking to establish
paternity. The requirement that a putative father's acknowledgment be accompanied by
the mother's oath empowers the mother to prevent a putative father from utilizing this
statutory mechanism as evidence of paternity. The statute is, therefore, of extremely lim
ited use in situations such as that arising in P.B. C
78. Lowell, 380 Mass. at 670, 405 N.E.2d at 141; see supra note 74.
79. Id.
80. Wrenn, 503 F. Supp. at 226.
81. Id.
82. Higgins v. Ripley, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 929, 450 N.E.2d 186, 186 (1983).
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again, the extent of the mother's control over the process. In the usual
case, a newborn child is in the custody of the mother, whether she is
wed or unwed, and no question about her parentage exists. The
mother, having custody and control over the child, is thus in a posi
tion to determine whether or not the putative father is able to take
steps which produce evidence of a parent-child relationship, thereby
acknowledging his paternity by his conduct. The putative father's
ability to acquire a relationship with his child that would meet the
legal requirements of acknowledgment is therefore contingent on the
mother's cooperation.
In the situation in P.B. C, the mother prevented the putative fa
ther from having contact with the child and ensured that he would be
unable to establish paternity by acknowledgment. The putative father,
completely subject to the mother's will, was left in the impossible situ
ation of not being able to establish paternity until he had had substan
tial contact with the child and not being able to have that contact until
he had established paternity. Acknowledgment, like marriage to the
child's mother, is therefore a remedy of limited value to putative fa
thers in situations like that of the putative father P.B. C

3.

Adjudication of Paternity

A third possible way for a putative father to establish paternity is
through a judicial adjudication of paternity. Massachusetts law pro
vides by statute for "proceedings to determine the father of a child
born to an unmarried woman."83 The legislature intended the statute
for use by an unmarried woman who seeks to compel a man to accept
responsibility for his paternity and provide child support,84 and the
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Proceedings to determine the father of a child born to an unmarried woman shall
be begun, if in the superior court, in the county in which is situated the place
where the alleged father or mother of the illegitimate child lives, and if begun in a
district court, in the court having such place within the jUdicial district. If the
alleged father pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is found guilty, the court shall
adjudge him the father of the child; but such adjudication shall not be made after
a plea of not guilty, against the objection of the alleged father, until the child is
born or the court finds that the mother is a least six months pregnant. At the
sitting when such adjudication is made by a district court, if made after a plea of
not guilty, the alleged father may appeal therefrom to a jury of six session of the
district court department in the county where the proceedings were held. The
adjudication, whether any sentence be imposed or not, shall be final and conclu
sive unless an appeal therefrom be taken as hereinbefore provided. . . .
84. Commonwealth v. Dias, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 282,423 N.E.2d 803 (1981) (purpose
of chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws is to determine paternity and
provide for support of child), superseded, 385 Mass. 455, 432 N.E.2d 506 (1982).
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statute apparently does not create a cause of action for fathers.
Through references to alleged fathers as defendants, the language of
the statute appears to preclude men from filing suit under it,85 and the
Massachusetts high court has so interpreted it. 86 The P.B. C. plaintiff,
therefore, lacked anY'opportunity to establish his paternity by means
of a paternity suit brought pursuant to this statute.
4.

Equity Jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court

The second statutory forum for determining paternity in Massa
chusetts lies within the general equity jurisdiction of the probate and
family court. 87 A putative father who believes that he is the father of
an illegitimate child may invoke this equity jurisdiction to establish
85. Chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws speaks of an alleged
father who "pleads guilty or nolo contendere" or "is found guilty" and who may "appeal"
from the adjudication "whether any sentence be imposed or not." Such language clearly
implies that men are intended to be defendants, not plaintiffs, in paternity adjudications
pursuant to the statute.
86. Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79, 80, 345 N.E.2d 370, 371 (1976) (paternity
proceedings under chapter 273, section 12 of the Massachusetts General Laws are not initi·
ated by the putative father). In Normand v. Barkei, the supreme judicial court faced the
issue of whether a putative father can institute paternity proceedings pursuant to chapter
273, § 12. The plaintiff asserted that he was the father of an illegitimate child and sought
visitation rights. Because the child's mother disputed whether the plaintiff was indeed the
father, it was necessary, as a first step, that the court determine paternity prior to issuing an
order for visitation. In reviewing the plaintiff's action, the supreme judicial court empha
sized that a putative father's resort to chapter 273, § 12 could "hardly be expected." Nor
mand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 852,434 N.E.2d 631, 632 (1982).
Likewise, in Gardner, where the father of an illegitimate child sought to obtain rights
to visit the child, the court stated that "[p]roceedings under chapter 273, §§ 11-19 are . . .
not initiated by the putative father." Gardner at 80, 345 N.E.2d at 371.
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 6 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent
part:
The probate and family court department shall have original and concurrent ju
risdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior court department of
all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity
jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be courts of general equity juris
diction, except that the superior court department shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction of all actions in which injunctive relief is sought in any matter grow
ing out of a labor dispute as defined in section twenty C of chapter one hundred
and forty-nine.
Probate courts shall also have jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme judi
cial and superior courts, of all cases and matters in which equitable relief is
sought relative . . . [and to] grant equitable relief to enforce foreign judgments
for support of a wife or a wife and minor children against a husband who is a
resident or inhabitant of this commonwealth, upon an action by the wife com
menced in the county of which the husband is a resident or inhabitant. They
shall, after the divorce judgment has become absolute, also have concurrent juris
diction to grant equitable relief in controversies over property between persons
who have been divorced. . . .
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paternity and be afforded visitation rights. 88
In Normand v. Barkei, a man who claimed to be the father of two
illegitimate children sought an order from the probate and family
court granting him visitation rights. 89 The defendant mother denied
that the plaintiff was the father of one of the 'children and doubted
whether he was the father of the other child. 90 In reviewing the trial
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the notion that "the
Probate and Family Court could not act where the plaintiff's paternity
has not been conceded by the defendant mother or otherwise estab
lished"91 because to so limit the lower court's jurisdiction would have
the result of endorsing the defendant mother's "[absolute] control [of]
the plaintiff's access to the courtS."92
Relying on Normand,93 the P.B. C. plaintiff brought his claim for
an adjudication of paternity under the probate and family court's eq
uity jurisdiction. 94 The supreme judicial court, however, declared this
reliance to be misplaced. The court distinguished Normand, explain
ing that jurisdiction is conferred on the lower court to adjudicate pa
ternity claims brought solely by fathers of illegitimate children. 95
Where a presumption of paternity in a married woman's husband af
fords legitimacy to a child, however, no illegitimate child exists to con
fer the appropriate jurisdiction on the probate and family court. The
88. Normand, 385 Mass. at 853, 434 N.E.2d at 623. When paternity is acknowl
edged by both parents and custody or visitation is in dispute, the probate and family court
makes findings and orders appropriate to resolving the conflict. Gardner, 370 Mass. at 80,
345 N.E.2d at 371. When paternity is not conceded by the mother, the court simply deter
mines paternity as a first step and then, if the plaintiff is determined to be the father, makes
a decision as to what, if any, visitation rights he should have. Normand, 385 Mass. at 853,
434 N.E.2d at 632-33.
89. Normand, 385 Mass. at 851, 434 N.E.2d at 632.
90. Id.
91. /d. at 852, 434 N.E.2d at 632.
92. Id. at 853, 434 N.E.2d at 633.
93. In fact, the attorney for the plaintiff in P.B.C believed that Normand was di
rectly controlling, explaining that H[w]e always thought we were dealing with an illegiti
mate child." Telephone interview with Marian Carpenter, attorney for the plaintiff in
P.B.C (December 6, 1985).
94. P.D.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
95. The court stated:
The question [of whether plaintiff can rebut the presumption of legitimacy] was
not before us in Normand v. Barkei,. . . on which the plaintiff relies as support
for his contention that he has a right to prove that he is the child's father. Nor
mand v. Barkei . . . sheds little light on the issue before us because in that case
the children's mother was unmarried when the children were conceived and were
born. There was no question of legitimacy.
Id. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096 (emphasis added).
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court's ability to hear a putative father's claim, and his corresponding
ability to seek redress are thus restricted by the presumption of
legitimacy.96
This part of the note has demonstrated how the supreme judicial
court's decision in P.D. C. in the context of Massachusetts paternity
law, classifies parents by giving putative fathers fewer rights than pre
sumed fathers and, indeed, often precluding putative fathers from be
ing able to establish paternity. Because presumed fathers do not have
to establish paternity and are provided with ample methods of pro
tecting their parent-child relationship, the classification scheme impli
cates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
When the equal protection clause is so implicated, a court must
consider whether the classification affects either a suspect class or a
fundamental right. 97 If it does, the court must strictly scrutinize the
classification, and it will survive constitutional attack only if the state's
ends are found to be compelling, and the means to that end are nar
rowly drawn. 98 The next part of the note will argue that the right
affected by the classification of parents-the right to establish pater
nity-is a fundamental right. 99
96. The putative father in P.B. C essentially asserted that his child was born out of
wedlock, in that the child was the product of a union between himself and a woman not his
wife. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1095. This paralleled the claim of the
putative father in Normand. Normand, 385 Mass. at 851, 434 N.E.2d at 632. In P.B.C,
the court did not order an adjudication of paternity because of its adherence to the pre
sumption of paternity in the mother's husband. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483
N.E.2d at 1099. In the absence of any presumption of legitimacy, the Normand court did
remand the case to probate court for a determination of paternity. Normand, 385 Mass. at
853, 434 N.E.2d at 633. Reading the two cases together reveals, therefore, that, pursuant to
chapter 213, section 6 of the Massachusetts General Laws, the probate court, while em
powered to adjudicate the paternity of an illegitimate child, is precluded from doing so in
the face of a presumption of legitimacy.
97. See infra notes 101-166 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
99. This note does not assert that putative fathers constitute a suspect class. The
Supreme Court has found that suspect classifications under the equal protection clause are
those which classify by alienage or national origin or by race. See, e.g., Graham v. Rich
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). Such
classifications will be subjected to strict scrutiny because "[t]hese factors are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy . . . ." City of Cleburne, Tex.
v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
Gender based classifications, because they so often rest on stereotypes rather than
valid distinctions between the sexes, are subjected to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Thus the Court has looked at the nature ofthe group affected by a classification; where
a classification is broadly drawn, and the affected group can resort to the democratic polit
ical process to correct unwise or unfair classifications the Court has been willing to uphold
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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

The Supreme Court has protected familial interests and concerns
in a long line of cases and in a variety of contexts. 100 While emphasiz
ing that the freedom to enter into and maintain family relationships is
a "fundamental element of personal liberty,"101 the Court has none
theless varied the nature and extent of the constitutional protection
given to the formation and maintenance of familial associations de
pending on the particular factual setting involved. 102 Some aspects of
familial relationships, then, are considered fundamental and thus wor
thy of the highest degree of constitutional protection, while others are
given less protection or none at all.
In assessing the amount of protection to be afforded to particular
familial choices, the Court strives to find a "balance . . . [between]
respect for the liberty of the individual. . . and the demands of organ
ized society."103 In striking that balance, although mindful of tradi
tions which have been discarded as well as those which have
endured,I04 the Court has historically afforded the most protection to
familial interests associated with such traditional institutions as marthe state scheme. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (retirement guidelines affecting older workers is not a suspect classification). Where
a classification affects "discrete and insular minorities" for whom the operation of the polit
ical process is seriously curtailed, the Court has found "a more searching judicial inquiry"
to be appropriate. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Putative fathers, as a class, do not possess such immutable characteristics as sex or
race which distinguish them from other fathers. Nor is there any indication that their
access to and voice in the political process is hampered. In sum, putative fathers do not
share those qualities which the Court has traditionally pointed to in delineating suspect
classifications.
100. In Moore v. City ofEast Cleve/and, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1977) (citations omit
ted), the Court reviewed the parameters of this protection, noting that it had protected
family interests "concerned with freedom of choice with respect to childbearing, or with
the rights of parents to the custody and companionship of their own children, or with
traditional parental authority in matters of child rearing and education."
101. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249 (1984).
102. In Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3249, the Court articulated the barometer of constitu
tional protection as the degree of intimacy involved in the particular relationship, stating
that "certain kinds of highly personal relationships [will receive] a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified intrusion by the state." For the Court in Roberts, those relation
ships included: "the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage . . . childbirth . . .
and cohabitation with one's relatives." Id. at 3250.
103. Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
104. The Court articulated an awareness of "the traditions from which [this balance
of societal versus private interests] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing. . . . [A] decision which builds on what has survived is
likely to be sound." Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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riage and the nuclear family.105 For example, the Court has held that
rights associated with marital privacy lO6 and parental authority lO7 are
fundamental rights.
Recently, however, the Court has delved beneath the surface of
superficial factual settings to protect familial rights and relationships
in nontraditional settings lO8 by invoking the basic principles underly
ing its decisions in traditional areas of family life. In articulating those
basic principles, the Court has focused on the "constitutionally recog
nized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship . . . and
basic human right." 109 Indeed, the Court has concluded that the legal
status of families is not the determinant factor in regards to whether a
particular interest or relationship should be protected as fundamen
tal. 110 Rather, the underlying blood tie and the relationship that may
arise therefrom are of paramount import. I II The Court has thus im
plicitly acknowledged that "[b]iological [rather than legal] relation
ship is the test that has been used-since time immemorial-. . . for
the fixing of. . . familial obligations, and it is biological relationship
that underlies and is traced by legal relationship."112
This section of the note will argue that a putative father's right to
establish paternity, although arising in a nontraditional setting, is a
fundamental right because it implicates the core biological relationship
between parent and child. By examining the Court's treatment of a
father's rights arising from his biological relationship to his illegiti
mate child, as well as the values underlying the Court's decisions in
more traditional family contexts, this section of the note will show
how granting fundamental status to a father's ability to prove pater
nity is both a logical extension of and consistent with the Court's deci
105. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-05.
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law forbidding the use of
contraceptives is an unconstitutional interference with the right of marital privacy).
107. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents have the freedom to choose to
enroll their children in private schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(state may not interfere with parental freedom to decide to have children instructed in
foreign languages).
108. See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text. See also Caban v. Moham
med, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
109. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977) (N.Y. pro
cedures for removing children from custody of foster families are constitutionally
adequate).
110. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 n.53.
111. H. KRAUSE, supra note 3 at 69.
112. Id.
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sions in this area. 113
A.

The Supreme Court's Approach to Biological Fathers

Since 1972, the Supreme Court has decided four cases regarding
the rights of biological fathers in regard to their illegitimate children.
In the landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois,114 the Court explicitly rec
ognized the "significant interest" of an unwed father in securing and
protecting his relationship with his child. I IS The plaintiff in Stanley,
an unwed father, challenged an Illinois statute that attached a pre
sumption of parental unfitness to an unwed father and provided, there
fore, that upon the death of the child's mother, the illegitimate child
would become a ward of the state. 116 The plaintiff argued that due
process entitled him to a fitness hearing before his child could be taken
away from him, and the Court agreed. 1l7
Noting that the unwed father in Stanley had taken parental re
sponsibility for his children by living with them since birth, the Court
found that his interest in the "companionship, care, [and] custody
. . ." of his children was fundamental. 118 The Court further found
that, although procedure by presumption was speedy and inexpensive,
the important nature of a father's interest in his child required the
protection of a fitness hearing}19 Although arising in the context of
procedural due process, 120 Stanley represents a strong indication of the
113. An ongoing debate among scholars of constitutional law concerns whether the
Court ought to be deriving "new" fundamental values in the course of constitutional adju
dication. While the Constitution guarantees certain specific, named rights, it also contains
open-ended provisions which call for judicial interpretation to determine their precise con
tent as applied to a given case. For the view that the Court's analysis should center on
written constitutional text except where the right at issue is one not fully protected by the
political process, see, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980). For the view
that tradition, history, and basic national values are legitimate sources of constitutional
interpretation, see, e.g., Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975).
114. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

115. The Court stated that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful counter
vailing interest, protection." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
116. Id. at 646.
117. Id. at 657-58.
118. Id. at 651-52.
119. Id. at 658.
120. Stanley involved a procedural due process claim while this note presents a fun
damental right analysis under equal protection. In both cases, however, a state foreclosed a
father's interest in his child by the operation of a presumption. The plaintiff in Stanley was
afforded no opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness of an unwed father; the
P.B.C plaintiff was prevented from attempting to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
Illinois and Massachusetts thus used similar "procedure by presumption" devices to deny a
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Court's desire to afford maximum protection to parent-child
relationships.
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott,121 the Court encountered
another situation involving the rights of an unwed father. In Quilloin,
the plaintiff attempted to veto the adoption of his child by the child's
mother and her husband. 122 Finding that the plaintiff had never exer
cised any significant responsibility for the child during its eleven years,
the Court was able to distinguish Stanley and hold that the plaintiff in
Quilloin had no right to veto the adoption. 123
One year after Quilloin, an unwed father who had significantly
participated in his child's upbringing, even though he was not then
living with the child, appealed to the Supreme Court the denial of his
attempt to veto the child's adoption. In Caban v. Mohammed,124 the
Court held that when a biological father takes paternal responsibility
for his child, the Constitution will protect his rights to that child
whether or not he lives with the child. 125 Caban was thus entitled to
participate in the decision concerning his child's adoption. 126
The most recent biological father case to come before the Court
was Lehr v. Robertson. 127 In Lehr the Supreme Court rejected a claim
from a putative father challenging a New York statute which denied
him notice and a hearing before the adoption of his illegitimate
child. 128 The Court noted that the putative father had not used the
state procedure for asserting parental rights-signing New York's pu
tative father registry, which would have assured him of notice of adop
man's parental interest in his child. The Court's deference to the "substantial and cogniza
ble" interest of a father in his children in Stanley and its refusal to validate Illinois' reliance
on mere presumption as a basis for state action these circumstances signals that, at least, a
state must provide an opportunity for rebuttal of the underlying presumption when it acts
to impinge upon a significant parental interest. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650-5\. This note
argues that establishing paternity is a similarly vital parental interest for the plaintiff in
P.B.C. See infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text. The Stanley Court placed a high
value on protecting the parent-child relationship; so high, indeed, that had Illinois bur
dened that relationship by means of a substantive rather than procedural law, the Court's
solicitude for the parent-child tie would have led to judicial invalidation of the law even
under substantive due process. Fundamental values, although derived under substantive
due process, are also a touchstone for analysis under equal protection. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (the right to marry, determined to be fundamental in a sub
stantive due process analysis, examined under equal protection strict scrutiny analysis).
12\' Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
122. [d. at 247.
123. [d. at 255-56.
124. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
125. [d. at 393-94.
126. [d. at 394.
127. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
128. [d. at 250.
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tion proceedings-and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 129
In Lehr the Court drew on the principles underlying its decisions
in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban to announce the principle that the
Constitution protects an established relationship between parents and
their children, but not "the mere existence of biological links. . . . "130
The Court described "[t]he significance of the biological connection
. . ." in Lehr as "offer[ing] ... an opportunity . . . to develop a rela
tionship" with the child. \31 The Court explained that
If [the biological father] grasps that opportunity and accepts
some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy
the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely val
uable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so,
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to
listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.132

Both Stanley and Caban had "grasp[ed] [the] opportunity," and
the Court held the resulting relationship to be worthy of the highest
degree of constitutional protection. \33 Quilloin, on the other hand,
who had not acted on the opportunity to develop a relationship with
his child, did not have a fundamental interest worthy of constitutional
protection. 134
Lehr was significantly different from Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban
because it was the only case in which the putative father alleged that
the child's mother had thwarted his efforts to "grasp [the] opportu
nity" to develop a relationship with his child. 135 Nevertheless, the
Court stressed that, via the putative father registry, the state had pro
vided Lehr with an alternative method for asserting parental rights.
Thus the Court found no constitutional infirmity where the claiming
129.

Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 261.
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id.
133. In Stanley, the mother and putative father had lived together "intermittently"
for 18 years. During that time they had three children. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. In
Caban, the couple lived together from September, 1968 until the latter part of 1973. The
mother, Maria, gave birth to two children, David in 1969, and Denise in 1971. Caban, 441
U.S. at 382.
134. In Quilloin, the mother and natural father never married nor lived together.
The child was born in 1964, however, adoption proceedings were not begun until 1976 and
it was at this time that the natural father first expressed an interest in him. Quilloin, 434
U.S. at 247. The Court noted that the father had "never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus hal d) never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." Id. at 256.
135. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
130.
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father had not availed himself of this state-provided alternative. 136
The Court expressed doubt, however, about the constitutionality of a
scheme which would place the putative father's ability to establish a
parent-child relationship--protectable as a fundamental right-wholly
beyond his control. 137
The Court has never addressed the issue presented by P.B. c., that
of protecting a putative father's right to develop a relationship with his
child when he is given no opportunity to do SO.138 In the situation
faced by the putative father in P.B. c., the child's mother resisted his
efforts to participate in the child's upbringing, and the state, offering
no effective alternative method for securing parental rights, ultimately
blocked his last attempt to gain an interest in the child that might be
his.139 Despite his alleged biological connection to the child, neither
the state nor the mother gave the putative father an opportunity to
take the steps which would establish a parent-child relationship "of
the highest constitutional significance."I40 Clearly, without such an
136. Id. at 265.
137. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, recognized that, "if qualification for
notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be thought proce
durally inadequate." Id. at 264.
138. While Massachusetts, like New York, does provide a statutory method by
which a putative father may receive notice of adoption proceedings, that method would not
have helped the putative father in P.B.C. to prove paternity.
Chapter 210, section 4A of the Massachusettts General Laws provides that when an
unmarried woman gives birth to a child, a man claiming to be the father may file a paternal
responsibility claim with the Massachusetts Department of Social Services. Such a filing
entitles a putative father to receive notice of any adoption preceedings involving the child.
Two problems arise under this statute for a putative father who, like the plaintiff in
P.B. c., seeks not only notice of adoption, but also the right to establish a parent-child
relationship with a child who was conceived by a married woman.
First, the statute provides merely for notice of adoption proceedings. This was not the
remedy sought by P.B.C. Mere notice of adoption is a hollow remedy for a man who seeks
to prove his paternity, and upon that biological link, develop an intimate familial relation
ship with his child. This statute thus provides an inadequate remedy to a putative father
who desires to make a "full committment to the responsibilities of parenthood."
Secondly, the statute allows paternal responsibility claims regarding children "born
out of wedlock." The supreme judicial court has explicitly stated that a child conceived by
a married woman is not illegitimate even though she is no longer married at the time of the
child's birth. This administrative procedure would therefore have been unavailable to a
putative father whose child was conceived by a married woman, as was the circumstance
for the plaintiff in P.B. C. P.B. c., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 483 N.E.2d at 1095.
The paternal responsibility claim is therefore an ineffective remedy for a putative fa
ther who seeks rights more extensive than simple notice of adoption and whose child was
presumed to be the legitimate issue of a married woman and her former husband.
139. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99. See supra notes 66
96.
140. E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 351 (1984).
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opportunity, "the protected [relationship] . . . will never arise."141
If an established parent-child relationship is protected by the
Constitution as a fundamental right, the critical question raised by
P.B. C. is whether the opportunity to develop that relationship should
also be protected as a fundamental right. This note argues that it must
be, for not protecting the opportunity has the effect of completely evis
cerating the right.
Treating an unwed father's right to prove paternity as a funda
mental right is a logical extension of the doctrine developed in Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr. If the Court is to protect as fundamental
established relationships between fathers and their children,142 then it
must also give utmost protection to the means by which a putative
father may achieve that established relationship. When a mother
blocks a putative father's attempts to establish a relationship with his
alleged child, and the state provides no alternative means for him to
do so, then the putative father's only recourse is a judicial determina
tion that he is, indeed, the father of the child. Only that determination
will enable the putative father to gain visitation, custody, or other ac
cess to the child,143 which will, in tum, allow him to establish a re1a
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
143. Once a putative father is adjudicated the biological father of a child, he will
have the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, if that is in the child's best
interest. Massachusetts courts are required to make decisions affecting children with the
goal of determining and effectuating the best interest of the child. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1985):
In making an order or judgment relative to the custody of children pending a
controversy between their parents, or relative to their final possession, the rights
of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal, and the
happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody or possession.
Upon the filing of an action in accordance with the provisions of this section,
section twenty-eight of this chapter or section thirty-two of chapter two hundred
and nine and until a judgment on the merits is rendered, absent emergency condi
tions, abuse or neglect, the parents shall have shared legal custody of any minor
child of the marriage; provided, however, that the judge may enter an order for
temporary legal custody for one parent if written findings are made that such
shared custody would not be in the best interest ofthe child and that the parties do
not have a history of being able and willing to cooperate in matters concerning
the child. The court shall require the parents to submit a plan in writing to the
court within thirty days of the entry of the temporary custody order setting forth
the details of shared legal custody including but not limited to procedures for
resolving disputes between the parties with respect to child raising decisions and
duties. If at the time of the hearing on the merits the parties have filed such a
plan with repspect to shared legal custody, and the court determines that the plan
has made proper provisions in the best interest of the child, and that the parties
have carried out the provisions of the plan in the best interest of the child, both
parties shall continue to have shared legal custody of the child. The court may
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tionship worthy of protection as a fundamental right. Protecting as
fundamental a man's right to prove that he is the biological father of
his child is thus a logical and necessary extension of constitutional
doctrine in the area of familial relationships.
If the right to establish paternity is not a fundamental right, then
a court would be able to rebuff a putative father's effort to adjudicate
paternity. Not recognized legally as the father and turned away by
the mother, the putative father would be left empty handed and would
have no hope of ever establishing a paternal relationship significant
enough to be protected as fundamental. If a putative father's right to
prove paternity is not treated as a fundamental right, then the putative
father's fundamental right that arises from an established relationship
stems from the purely fortuitous circumstance that the child's mother
permitted it. To anchor the father's right to his child to the good will
of the mother is wholly inconsistent with the Court's demonstrated
concern for the rights of fathers.
B.

Fundamental Rights in the Areas of Procreation, Privacy, and
Child-Rearing

In addition to being a logical and necessary extension of existing
law in the area of biological fathers' relationships with their children,
finding fundamental a putative father's right to prove paternity is conmodify the plan with the agreement of both parties and shall review this operation
of the plan within one year of the date of its adoption, if a hearing on the merits
has not been held within such time. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit
the power of the court at such time or any any (sic) time thereafter to make any
order relative to the custody of the child, including an order for shared legal
custody, if it determines it to be in the child's best interest. When considering the
happiness and welfare of the child the court may consider whether or not the
child's present or past living conditions adversely affects his physical, mental,
moral or emotional health when making an order or judgment relative to the
custody of said child. For purposes of this section, shared legal custody shall be
defined as a continued mutual responsibility and involvement by both parents in
decisions regarding the child's welfare in matters of education, medical care, emo
tional, moral and religious development.
The entry of an order or judgement relative to the custody of minor children
shall not negate or impede the ability of the parent not granted custody to have
such access to the academic, medical, hospital, or other health records of the
child, as he would have had if the custody order or judgement had not been en
tered.
Where the parents have reached an agreement providing for the custody of
the children, the court may enter an order in accordance with such agreement,
unless specific findings are made by the justice indicating that such an order
would not be in the best interests of the children.
(emphasis added).
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sistent with the values the Supreme Court has sought to protect in the
areas of procreation, privacy, and child-rearing.
1.

Procreation

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the right of procreation is
a fundamental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rei Williamson. l44 In
Skinner, an Oklahoma statute required compulsory sterilization upon
a third conviction for certain felonies, while exempting other enumer
ated felonies from the sterilization requirement. 145 The Court struck
down the statute, holding that it violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution by singling out some
felonies, such as larceny, for punishment by sterilization, while ex
empting similar crimes, such as embezzlement. 146
In Skinner the Court found procreation to be "one of the basic
civil rights of man,"147 explaining that the right to have children is
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,"148 and
that one who loses that right is "forever deprived of a basic human
liberty."149 In Skinner, the Supreme Court thus exhibited its deep
concern for a person's freedom to choose to be a parent.
A putative father's right to prove paternity embodies values simi
lar to Skinner's right to procreate. In both instances, the right in
volves fatherhood, blood ties, and progeny. A man who is precluded
from asserting his paternity of a child is denied any sense of father
hood as surely as a man who is rendered sexually sterile. The vasec
tomy imposed on Skinner by Oklahoma law would have left his sexual
functioning intact but without any possibility of resulting fatherhood;
similarly, refusing to permit a putative father to prove paternity would
have no effect on his sexual freedom or ability, but it would prevent
him from being a father to his child. Because the right of a man to
prove paternity implicates the same values the Court protected as fun
144. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Since Skinner,
procreation has been protected as a fundamental right in a number of cases. See. e.g., In re
Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). in which the court emphasized that the
personal rights at issue in a request by a parent or guardian for the sterilization of an adult
mentally retarded female require the judge to use utmost care in effectuating the substituted
judgment of the ward. Id. at 572, 432 N.E.2d at 724. The court reasoned that the right to
reproduce and the decision whether or not to have a child are central to the fundamental
right of privacy. Id. at 563-64, 432 N.E.2d at 719.
145. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
146. Id. at 541.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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damental in Skinner, it should also be protected as a fundamental
right.
2.

Privacy

The Supreme Court has also held that the right of privacy is a
fundamental right. 150 The Court first identified the right of privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut.15I In Griswold, the state of Connecticut pro
hibited the use of contraceptives by any person, whether married or
unmarried. 152 The Court found that marital privacy was a fundamen
tal right, explaining that specific constitutional guarantees have
"penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."153 In Griswold the Court conceded that
the right of marital privacy per se was not an express provision of the
Constitution, but went on to state that an analysis of the values pro
tected in the Bill of Rights revealed that certain relationships lie
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu
tional guarantees."154 The Court held that the right of marital pri
vacy, while not expressed in the Constitution, was "necessary in
making the express guarantees fully meaningful."155 Because the Con
necticut statute so deeply intruded upon the right of marital privacy,
the Court held that it was unconstitutional. I56
Aware of the Griswold ruling, Massachusetts tailored its anticon
traception statute to forbid the distribution of contraceptive articles to
unmarried persons. 157 The Supreme Court struck down that statute in
Eisenstadt v. Baird and held that the distinction between married and
unmarried persons was impermissible. 158 Explaining that the right of
privacy is not limited to married persons, the Court declared that "[i]f
150. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,499 (1965) ("[T]he right of privacy in
the marital relation is fundamental and basic.") (Goldberg, J., concurring).
151. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
152. Id. at 480, quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958): "Any person
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing concep
tion shaB be fined not less than fifty doBars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." (Section 53-32 was repealed in 1969.)
153. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
154. Id. at 485.
155. Id. at 483.
156. Id. at 485-86.
157. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450 (1972). The Court noted that "[t]he Mas
sachusetts Legislature merely made what it thought to be the precise accommodation nec
essary to escape the Griswold ruling."
158. Id. at 453. The Court explained that "[W]hatever the rights of the individual to
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the
married alike."
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the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."159 In Griswold and Baird, therefore,
the Court further evidenced its commitment to protecting the privacy
of a person's decision in regards to parenthood and extended that
commitment to unmarried persons. l60
The Court had another opportunity to consider the parameters of
the right of privacy in Roe v. Wade. 161 In Roe, the Court found that
the right of privacy includes a woman's decision to have an abor
tion. 162 The Court drew on previous decisions in which it had found
fundamental rights in activities relating to parenting, such as Skinner,
Baird, Pierce v. Society ofSisters, and Meyers v. Nebraska to conclude
that a woman's choice to abort is a fundamental right. 163 In Roe,
therefore, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to protect as funda
mental those choices and responsibilities that involve a person's oppor
tunity to become a parent.
The right of a putative father to establish paternity involves val
ues similar to those involved in a person's right to choose whether or
not to bring a child into the world. Each situation strikes at the heart
of one's opportunity to choose whether or not to become a parent, and
it is the protection of that interest that appears to be of particular im
portance to the Court. A putative father's inability to prove that he is
the biological father of a child destroys his potential relationship with
159. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
160. Justice Brennan, the author of the Baird opinion, later reflected on the Gris
wold-Baird line of cases and offered that, "[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusion by the State." Carey v. Population Services International, 431
U.S. 678, 687 (1977). Although Griswold dealt with couples in a marital relationship, Baird
"made clear that the constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of
childbearing is not dependent on that element." Id.
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. /d. at 154. After determining that the fundamental right to privacy encom
passes abortion, the Court considered the nature and weight of the state's interest in regu
lating or even proscribing abortion. After such consideration the Court held that the
state's interest in regulating abortion in the first trimester of the pregnancy is not compel
ling enough to overcome the woman's fundamental right to terminate the pregnancy. Id. at
163. In the second trimester, however, the state's interest in protecting the mother's health
becomes sufficiently compelling to permit regulation of the abortion procedure in such
ways as to effectuate that interest, such as licensing the physician who performs the abor
tion or the facility in which it is performed. Id. Finally, in the last trimester of the preg
nancy, when the fetus has reached "viability," the state's interest in protecting fetal life
reaches a level of significance to justify an absolute proscription on abortion. Id. at 163-64.
163. Id. at 152-53.
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that child as surely as if the child were never born. That the potential
relationship arises in a non marital setting has no impact on the degree
of intimacy and privacy involved, just as the marital status of a person
seeking to use contraceptives is irrelevant to the importance of the un
derlying interest. If the Constitution protects a person's childbearing
decision as fundamental, so it must protect a man's opportunity to
establish paternity.
3.

Child-Rearing

In addition to procreation and privacy, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the authority of parents to make decisions regarding
their children's upbringing is a fundamental right. In Meyers, the
Court invalidated a state law forbidding the teaching of certain foreign
languages to children, holding that the law unreasonably infringed
upon a basic liberty, guaranteed by the Constitution, "to establish a
home and bring up children."l64 Similarly, the Court applied the
highest degree of constitutional protection for parental authority in
Pierce. 165 Reasoning that a parent's traditional authority in decisions
affecting his child is a fundamental right, the Court held that a state
must allow parents the freedom to choose to send their children to
private rather than public schools. 166 These cases reveal the Court's
strong concern that traditional parental decisionmaking be free from
unwarranted intrusion by the government.
A putative father who is not permitted to establish his paternity
of a child is perforce precluded from playing any role in the rearing of
his child. A parental relationship with the child is an obvious prereq
uisite to the exercise of any parental authority over that child. Meyers
and Pierce concededly involved governmental respect for the authority
of those who were undisputedly the parents of the children affected by
the decisions, while P.B. C. involves a putative father whose paternity
is controverted. Nevertheless, the fundamental liberty of a parent to
raise his or her child is meaningless where a parent is unable, as a first
step, to show even the existence 'of a parent-child link. By refusing to
allow this putative father to attempt to prove his paternity, Massachu
setts has effectively eliminated any possibility of P.B.C.'s enjoying a
fundamental right that belongs to all parents.
This section of the note has demonstrated that a putative father's
right to prove paternity must be protected as a fundamental right for
164. Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
165. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
166. Id. at 535.
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two reasons. The first reason is because treating it as a fundamental
right is a logical and necessary extension of the Supreme Court's deci
sions in the area of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children.
Granting a putative father the opportunity to prove his biological rela
tionship to a child enables him to obtain visitation and other access to
that child. With such access, he will be able to establish a relationship
with the child. With that established relationship, he will be afforded
the utmost constitutional protection of his biological relationship to
the child. The removal of the first link, the opportunity to prove pa
ternity, results in the collapse of the entire structure: the putative fa
ther's biological relationship with his child is not protected because it
is not "established," and it is not "established" because he is not able
to prove the fact of the biological link. Such a result would severely
undercut the Court's decisions from Stanley to Lehr.
The second reason why a putative father's right to prove pater
nity should be protected as a fundamental right is because doing so
would be consistent with the values that the Supreme Court has pro
tected in the areas of procreation, privacy, and child-rearing. From
Skinner to Griswold to Baird and Roe, from Meyers to Pierce, the
Court has sought to protect as fundamental both a person's choice to
become a parent and the resulting decisions that arise from such a
choice. Depriving a man of the right to prove that he is the father of a
child has the effect of depriving him not only of the right to choose to
become a parent, but also of the right to make any decisions in regards
to that child. Granting a putative father the right to establish pater
nity would, on the other hand, give effect to his choice to become a
parent and thus be consistent with the Court's decisions in these areas.
V.

STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
CLASSIFICATION

Where a state action burdens a fundamental right, the Supreme
Court has applied strict judicial scrutiny to assess the constitutionality
of the action. 167 When strict scrutiny is applied, the state action will
167. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Texas system
of school financing, based on local property taxes, upheld despite resulting disparities in
funds available to local school districts) "We must decide first, whether the Texas system of
financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby
requiring strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 17.
If the state action does not impact upon a fundamental right, then a less rigorous
"rational basis" te~t is used to assess the validity of the action. If no fundamental right is
involved, "the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an
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survive constitutional attack only if it serves a compelling state inter
est, and the means are narrowly tailored to effect that interest. 168 This
part of the note will analyze the Massachusetts parental classification
system described in Part III in the context of strict scrutiny and will
argue that that classification system which burdens a putative father's
fundamental right to establish his paternity, does not survive such a
strict scrutiny analysis.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court identified three state
interests to support its holding in P.B. C. . These are promoting the
legitimacy of children,169 protecting family harmony,170 and ensuring
the care and support of children. 171 Each interest will be discussed in

tum. 172
A.

Promoting the Legitimacy of Children

In P.B. C. the supreme judicial court relied upon "the important
social policy of affording legitimacy to children whenever possible"173
to justify its refusal to allow the putative father to rebut the presump
tion of legitimacy in the mother's husband. This part of the note will
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587-88 (11th ed.
1985).
168. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973) (resident alien's right to prac
tice law not overcome even in the face of the state's interest in assuring the qualifications of
persons permitted to practice law, because state failed to show that the classification was
"necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest."); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state laws excluding aliens from state public assistance benefits or
imposing a long residency requirement struck down because such laws were not adequately
justified by interest in preserving public resources); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (state interest in conserving revenue by imposing a waiting period as a prerequisite
to receiving welfare benefits struck down as an impermissible burden on the fundamental
right to interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 (1967) (state law prohibiting
interracial marriages struck down because state failed to show that the law was "necessary
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective").
169. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
170. Id. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097.
171. Id.
172. In Wrenn v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 233 (1980), the Massachusetts federal district
court commented on another state interest of relevance here, the interest in avoiding fraud
ulent paternity claims, and alluded to "the danger that the wrong person may be charged
with fatherhood." Id. at 226. The Supreme Court has found that medical progress has
rendered this state interest less compelling as paternity testing has become more accurate.
In Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), a case striking down a two-year statute of limita
tions on the bringing of paternity actions, the Court stated that "the State's interest in
preventing the litigation of state or fraudulent paternity claims has become more attenuated
as scientific advances in blood testing have alleviated the problems of proof surrounding
paternity actions." Id. at 17.
173. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
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argue that a policy favoring legitimacy over illegitimacy is impermissi
ble under the Constitution.
Prejudice against illegitimacy undeniably exists in our society. 174
Although the stigma attached to illegitimacy may well be diminishing,
it nonetheless remains an important social force. 175 The issue is less
whether social stigma is cast on illegitimacy than "whether the reality
of private biases. . . [is a] permissible consideration"176 upon which
the state may base its action.
In Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of
a Florida state court divesting a mother of custody of her child.177
Pursuant to a divorce decree, Linda Sidoti had been awarded custody
of the couple's three-year-old daughter. 178 Fifteen months later her
former husband, the child's father, sought a change in the order and
an award of custody to him, based on the circumstance that the child's
mother had begun living with a black man, whom she married two
months later.179 The Florida court agreed with the father that the
mother's choice of live-in companion would likely cause the child to
suffer from "the social stigmatization"180 that would be cast on a ra
cially mixed household. Accordingly, the court concluded that
awarding custody to the father would serve the best interest of the
child. 181 The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
without opinion. 182
The Supreme Court agreed that the primary concern shoUld be
the child's we1fare l83 but forcefully rejected the notion that a court
could promote that welfare by giving constitutional force and effect to
private prejudices. 184 Conceding that the child might be subject to "a
variety of pressures and stress"185 stemming from her mother's inter
racial marriage, the Court held that "the reality of private biases and
the possible injury they might inflict are [not] permissible considera
174. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). "It would ignore reality to suggest that
racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have
been eliminated." Id. at 429.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 430.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 431.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 432.
185. Id. at 433.
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tions" on which a state may rely in custody proceedings. 186 The Court
concluded that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."187
The Palmore decision is concededly distinguishable from P.B. C.
in that Palmore involved consideration of race as the primary factor
in the Sidotis' custody dispute, whereas the issue in P.B. C. is illegiti
macy. The reasoning underlying the Palmore decision is nevertheless
applicable to P.B. C. Both classifications have their source in social
prejudice. In both cases the courts focused their inquiries not on pa
rental fitness, but on the negative social attitudes attaching to parental
choices and lifestyles. Mrs. Sidoti lived with a black man; P.B.C. was
not married to his child's mother. Both situations are met with socie
tal disfavor which may extend to the child as well as to the adults
involved. 188
Under Palmore, therefore, the Massachusetts court cannot rely
on the prejudice that attaches to illegitimacy as the announced motiva
tion behind a judicial decision. Because the court's reliance on the
avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy gives recognition and effect to
this form of prejudice, it is constitutionally impermissible.
Because it is impermissible, the state's interest in promoting the
legitimacy of its children fails to justify the parental classification that
burdens a putative father's fundamental right to establish a parent
child relationship.
B.

Protecting Family Harmony

In addition to promoting legitimacy, the Massachusetts Supreme
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. In a 1985 California Supreme Court case, Chief Justice Bird discussed whether
avoiding illegitimacy is a justifiable consideration in judicial decisions. In Michelle W. v.
Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 54, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985). Michelle Marie W. v.
Riley, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986), a putative father then married to the child's
mother sought to have himself declared the child's father. The court held that because the
mother was married to another man at the time of the child's birth, the former husband
was conclusively presumed to be the child's father. Id. The claiming father, despite the
fact that he was now married to the mother and living with her and the child as a family·
unit, was not permitted to rebut the presumption of paternity in the mother's first husband.
The court was thus able to preserve the legitimacy of the child. Id.
In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Bird "expressly disapprove[d] the cases which have
cited avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy as a policy consideration. . . ." Id. at - n.7,
703 P.2d at 99 n.7, 216 Cal. Rptr., 759-60 n.7 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Justice Bird, analo
gizing to the Palmore concern of avoiding the stigma of racial prejudice as an impermissible
judicial consideration, concluded that "private prejudice based on illegitimacy should be
accorded no greater judicial deference [than that based on race]." Id.
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Judicial Court cited the state's interest in protecting family harmony
to support its dismissal of the putative father's paternity action, stating
that "the Commonwealth has legitimate and strong interests in the
strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection and
care of children." 189
The family harmony the court wished to protect derives from the
fact of the marriage itself. Because a paternity suit brought by an out
sider could destroy the marriage, the court employed the irrebuttable
presumption to remove that threat. 190 Beyond the initial impact of the
litigation on the marriage, however, the court implied concern for the
continuing irritant of the third party father's presence in the couple's
lives in the exercise of any potential visitation rights 191 and extin
guished the putative father's ability to establish parentage in the inter
est of removing this continuing threat. 192
Neither of these aims survives a strict scrutiny analysis. Protect
ing the family from the initial disruption of litigation seems particu
larly unjustified in light of the facts of P.B. c., in which the mother and
husband had been married, divorced, and remarried before the litiga
tion ever began. 193 Conceding that "appropriate social policy might
be clearer if the marriage had been uninterrupted since the child was
conceived,"194 the court nevertheless chose to extinguish the putative
father's claim for the sake of a policy muddied by the past instability
of the marriage.
As to the potential for discord that may inhere in continued con
tact between the newly established family unit and the outsider father,
the Massachusetts Appeals Court has declared in another context that
that problem is not compelling enough to justify depriving a natural
father of a relationship with his child. 195 In In re Carson, the court
denied an adoption petition by a mother and her third husband where
the father, the mother's first husband, intervened in opposition to the
189. P.B.C., 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097 (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1 (West Supp. 1985».
190. Id. at 74-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098.
19l. Id. The court's concern for family harmony implies a desire to protect not only
the family unit as a whole, but also the married couple whose relationship forms the basis
of the family. Protecting the marital unit as the foundation of the family is a logical way of
protecting the family structure.
192. Id. at 75, 483 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
193. Id. at 70-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1096.
194. Id. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097.
195. In re Carson, 6 Mass. App. 665, 382 N.E.2d 1116 (1978), affd., 378 Mass. 793,
389 N.E.2d 90 (1979).
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adoption. 196 Although the mother, her third husband, and the child
lived together as a family unit while the father was an "outsider" to
that unit, the court insisted that any awkwardness or discomfort to the
child, and thereby to the family, caused by the persistent presence of a
former husband did not outweigh the father's right to associate with
his child. 197 The court held that a father's right to associate with his
child should not be severed absent a showing of unfitness. 198 This was
especially true when the absence of a parent-child relationship was due
to the mother's conduct. 199
For the court in Carson, therefore, the goal of protecting family
harmony was not sufficiently compelling to justify excluding a natural
parent from developing a parent-child relationship. Because the state
cannot subordinate a father's interest in a parent-child relationship to
the goal of enhancing family harmony, the state's interest in protecting
family harmony is not sufficiently compelling to support its classifica
tion of fathers.
The court in Carson was concerned that a father's ability to
achieve a relationship with his child should not tum on whether the
child and its mother constitute part of a family unit which does not
include the father. These concerns were likewise important to the
P.B. C. court. Although it is undeniable that granting a putative father
the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and establish his pa
ternity would require the family to make adjustments to the presence
of multiple father figures, Carson demonstrates that the burden of diffi
cult family adjustments does not outweigh a father's interest in know
ing his child.
C.

Ensuring Care and Support of Children

The third state interest identified by the supreme judicial court to
support its decision is that of ensuring care and support of children. 2°O
The state's interest in making fathers responsible for their children
clearly is compelling. Through its parens patriae power,201 the state is
196. [d. at 667, 382 N.E.2d at 1117-18.
197. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1118-19.
198. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1119.
199. [d. at 669, 382 N.E.2d at 1119.
200. P.B.C, 1985 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097.
201. Massachusetts has a compelling interest in assuring the protection of children
from abuse or other maltreatment. See. e.g.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18A, §§ 1-2
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985) (establishing Department of Youth Services and a program of
delinquency prevention); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18B, § 2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985)
(Department of Social Services to provide protective services for children); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 18B, § 6A (West Supp. 1985) (foster care review unit established); MASS.
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responsible for ensuring that children will receive the support they re
quire, that fathers will be held accountable for the children they sire,
and that the state will not be burdened by the support of children.
The presumption of legitimacy, made irrebuttable as to the plain
tiffin P.B.C., together with the statutory and common law framework
of parental rights in Massachusetts, does not, however, advance this
compelling state interest. Refusing to hear the putative father's claim,
whereby a caring and willing man offers to shoulder the responsibility
for his alleged child's financial support and offers to participate in the
care and upbringing of his child, does not ensure support for the child.
Indeed, the supreme judicial court's decision could actually inter
fere with the state's interest in ensuring care and support of children.
The following scenario illustrates this potential danger. The defendant
mother's husband, who was not a party to this proceeding, could bring
a future action to adjudicate the paternity of this child. 202 If he is then
excluded as the father and excused from the obligation to support the
child, the child would be left without any legal father. The putative
father could conceivably be of unknown whereabouts without knowl
edge of such a turn of events, or he may at that point be unwilling to
come forward to assert paternity. Massachusetts could then find itself
in the peculiar position of initiating paternity proceedings against a
putative father whose claim of paternity it had refused to hear.203
The state's interest in this area is not confined, however, to the
mere assurance that children are supported, but rather includes the
policy that they be supported by those appropriately responsible for
them. In Symonds v. Symonds,204 a case involving a divorce and an
accompanying denial of paternity by the husband, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stressed that, "[a] married man should have
no duty to support a child born to his wife during their marriage but
fathered by another man, any more than a wife should have a duty to
GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 111, § 186B (West 1981) (the sale of flammable sleepwear for children
prohibited); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1985) (providing for tem
porary custody of a minor child who is abused by a household member); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 29A, 29B (West Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the use of children as
subjects in pornography and the distribution of such matter).
202. See supra notes 15-16. The law presumes that a husband is the father of a child
born to his wife. Thus, he is legally recognized as the father until he rebuts the presump
tion pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 6 (West SUpp. 1985).
203. Massachusetts courts have interpreted MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12
as permitting the state to initiate paternity proceedings. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Lobo,
385 Mass. 436, 432 N.E.2d 496,503 (1982) ("Massachusetts may bring a complaint initiat
ing proceedings for paternity, because the statutory scheme protects the interests of the
state as well as those of the illegitimate child. ").
204. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 432 N.E.2d 700 (1982).
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support a child fathered by her husband during their marriage but
born of another woman."205 By refusing to adjudicate paternity in
P.R. c., thereby anchoring the duty of support not to a proven rela
tionship to the child, but rather to a marital relationship with the
mother, the supreme judicial court has completly abandoned the pol
icy announced in Symonds. Not only may the child end up without
any paternal support, but also, even if the husband does remain in
volved, the child may be receiving support from one who is not actu
ally responsible for that support.
The P.R. C. rule, operating within the scheme of Massachusetts
paternity law, thereby works to deny a putative father the opportunity
to support the child he claims as his. The rule imposes the support
obligation on a man whose only proven relationship is to his wife. The
presumption of legitimacy, made irrebuttable as to putative fathers,
promotes neither the state goal of ensuring that minor children are
supported nor the judicially enunciated policy of attaching the duty of
support to the man who actually fathered the child.
Because the state's interest in promoting legitimacy is constitu
tionally impermissible; its interest in protecting family harmony is
neither compelling nor, in light of the facts of P.R. c., served by the
classification; and its interest in ensuring care and support of children
is actually hindered by the classification, the classification does not
survive a strict scrutiny analysis. Thwarting a putative father's ability
to establish his paternity is thus an unconstitutional infringement of
his rights.
VI.

RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS

OF THE

MASSACHUSETTS CLASSIFICATION

If the reviewing court does not deem the interest of a putative
father in establishing his paternity a fundamental right, then it must
apply a rational relationship test, rather than strict scrutiny, to the
classification. The rational relationship standard of review provides
that if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state inter
est, the court should defer to the legislative judgment and uphold the
205. Id. at 544, 432 N.E.2d at 703. See also Lobo, 385 Mass. at 446, 432 N.E.2d at
502 ("The support and maintenance of children should be shared by those responsible for
bringing them into the world."). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reached the same
conclusion, finding "no justification or morality in a rule which tends to absolve the rightful
father of his duty of support, while imposing such an obligation upon an innocent husband
merely because of his marital relationship." Commonwealth ex reI. Savruk v. Derby, 235
Pa. Super. 560, 564, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (1975) (quoting Commonwealth ex reI. Leider v.
Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 433, 442, 233 A.2d 917, 921 (1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
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challenged state action. 206
A.

Traditional Rational Basis Review

Under this general rule of minimum level scrutiny, the Supreme
Court has often adopted a deferential approach, particularly in the
area of exclusively economic regulation. In Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Oklahoma opticians raised an equal protection challenge to the valid
ity of a law that distinguished between opticians and sellers of ready
to-wear glasses, subjecting the former, but not the latter, group to reg
ulations prior to the fitting of eyeglasses. 207 The trial court, after care
ful consideration of the record, concluded that the law was
unconstitutional because the means were "neither reasonably neces
sary nor reasonably related" to the state purpose of regulating the vis
ual health care of the public. 208
The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "[t]he prohibition of
the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious classifi
cation."209 The Court admitted that the law might "exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases," but nonetheless chose to defer to
the legislative judgment, announcing that
[i]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages. . . . The day is gone when this Court uses the
Due Process Clause [to] strike down state laws, regulatory of busi
ness and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvi
dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. 210

B.

Rational Basis Review "With Bite"

Although the Court has demonstrated extreme deference to legis
lative judgment in the area of economic regulation, rational basis
206. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55
(1985), the Court described the "general rule" of equal protection analysis, absent implica
tion of a fundamental right or involvement of a suspect class, in the following terms:
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sus
tained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protec
tion Clause allows the states wide latitude, and the constitution presumes that
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.
For application of this general rule of rational basis, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
207. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1955).
208. Id. at 486.
209. Id. at 489.
210. Id. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
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analysis does not always mean automatic deference. In recent years,
legal scholars and at least some members of the Court have begun to
express dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the traditional two-tiered
equal protection system, whereby classifications affecting fundamental
rights or suspect classes are virtually always struck down via the appli
cation of strict scrutiny, while other classifications, particularly in the
economic sphere, are almost always upheld under a rational basis
analysis.
Justice Marshall has been the most vociferous member of the
Court in criticizing the two-tiered system, recommending that it be
replaced with a more fluid approach. In his dissent in San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, a case involving the constitutionality of
the Texas system of school financing, based on local property taxes
and resulting in disparities between richer and poorer districts, Justice
Marshall suggested that a "principled reading" of the Court's deci
sions reveals that it has not treated equal protection claims merely as
either strict scrutiny or rational basis cases. 2l1 Rather, the Court "has
applied a spectrum of standards" to decide equal protection cases. 212
In Justice Marshall's opinion, where a particular case lies on that spec
trum should depend on "the constitutional and societal importance of
the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."213
Constitutional scholars have also noted the blurring of sharp di
viding lines between the levels of the strict, two-tiered system. Profes
sor Gunther, for exam pie, argues that the Court has begun to blur the
traditional distinctions between strict scrutiny and rational basis by
adding "bite" to the lower level of scrutiny.214 This rational basis
"with bite" approach has enabled the Court to strike down some laws
that burden neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class.
Several cases serve to illustrate this developing "bite" to rational
basis scrutiny. By examining the reasons why the Court chose to do
more than simply defer to the legislative judgment in those cases, this
part of the note will demonstrate how the application of a more in
211. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 589-90 (11th ed. 1985). Professor Gun
ther comments that, "for the first time in years, old equal protection standards occasionally
mean something other than perfunctory opinions sustaining the law under attack. Occa
sionally, moreover, reformulations of 'mere rationality' standards hint at increased bite to
the scrutiny." Id. at 590.
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tense rational basis analysis is equally appropriate in the case of a pu
tative father's right to establish paternity.
In the area of illegitimacy, for example, the Court has dealt with
attacks on state statutes that evidenced a preference for legitimate over
illegitimate children. 2ls Although the Court has never considered ille
gitimate children a suspect class, it has consistently accorded laws that
affect them more than deferential, "toothless" scrutiny.216 For exam
ple, in Trimble v. Gordon the Court struck down a statute that barred
intestate succession by illegitimate children from natural fathers, even
in the presence of an adjudication ofpaternity.217 The Court carefully
considered the state's interest at stake, that of promoting legitimacy,
and concluded that that interest was not significant enough to justify
the classification. 2ls Even under a rational basis test, the Court ex
plained, "the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere
incantation of a proper state purpose."219 Because Trimble involved a
legally disadvantaged group of people who needed special judicial pro
tection and because the classification impacted on substantive rights,
the Court chose to look very closely at the validity of the statute. 220
This was a marked departure from the Court's posture of virtually
215. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
216. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
217. Id. at 776.
218. Id. at 768-69.
219. Id. at 769.
220. Trimble is one in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court examined classifi
cations based on illegitimacy. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court struck
down a state law which made wrongful death damages available to legitimate, but not
illegitimate, children upon the death of their mothers. Four years later, in Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court refused to permit the claims of dependent
unacknowledged illegitimate children to be subordinated to the claims of legitimate chil
dren under a workers' compensation law.
In other cases, the Supreme Court continued to demonstrate that while illegitimacy
was not to be considered a suspect classification, and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny,
the rational basis analysis that was appropriate would not be "toothless." For example, in
Mathews, 427 U.S. 495, the Court held that in claims for Social Security benefits for depen
dent children, it was permissible to presume dependency in the case of legitimate children
while requiring illegitimate children to prove dependency. The court explained that "per
haps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of
the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes." Id. at 506.
Accordingly, the Court has struck down state laws which exclude illegitimate children
from a right to paternal support, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), and which impose
restrictive statute of limitations requirements on paternity suits brought for the purposes of
identifying and obtaining support from unwed fathers, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
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automatic deference in Lee Optical. 221
Rational basis "with bite" is further illustrated in the case of Lo
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., in which the Court held unconstitu
tional a statute extinguishing employment discrimination claims that
were not processed within a designated amount of time. 222 The plain
tiff had raised both procedural due process and equal protection chal
lenges to the statute. The Court's opinion rested on procedural due
process grounds, but four justices found the equal protection claim
"sufficiently important" to write a separate opinion invalidating the
statute under equal protection. 223
The Illinois law at issue in Logan required that a hearing take
place within 120 days of the filing of an employment discrimination
claim. 224 The agency that handled the claims inadvertently scheduled
plaintiff's hearing for a date five days after the statutory period and
was thus deprived of jurisdiction over the claim. 22s The justices who
considered plaintiff's equal protection claim, conceding its "unconven
tional" nature, nonetheless found that the statute created a classifica
tion whereby one class of claims-those processed within 120 days
would be preserved, while another class-those not processed within
120 days-would be extinguished. 226 Emphasizing that the "rational
basis standard is 'not a toothless one,' "227 the justices evaluated the
state's interests at hand-eradicating employment discrimination and
discouraging false claims against employers-and found that the clas
sification did not rationally advance those interests. 228
While the justices professed to be doing no more than applying
mere rational basis scrutiny, at least one commentator has noted the
"unusual" nature of the Court's approach to the case. 229 Justice
Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion for the Court striking
down the Illinois law on procedural due process grounds, nevertheless
took the additional step of sUbmitting a separate opinion in which he
221. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
222. Logan, 455 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1982).
223. Justice Blackmun authored the separate opinion, with which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and O'Connor joined. Id. at 438-42.
224. Logan, 455 U.S. at 424.
225. Id. at 426-27.
226. The Court explained that Logan was an "unconventional" equal protection case
because the statute contained no classification on its face. The effect of the statute, how
ever, was to divide claims into two groups and treat each group differently and in that way
the statute triggered equal protection. Id. at 438-39.
227. [d. at 439 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976».
228. Logan, 455 U.S. at 427.
229. G. GUNTHER, supra note 53, at 619.
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pointed out that the statute would also fail under equal protection. 230
Justice Blackmun and the three justices who joined in this separate
opinion found that the equal protection issue, while unnecessary to the
decision, was so important that it merited discussion. Applying the
least rigorous intensity ofjudicial review, Justice Blackmun found that
the statute failed to withstand constitutional attack. 231 In a concur
ring opinion, Justice Powell urged a narrow decision yet agreed that
the statute did not meet even the minimum rationality test. 232 The
striking aspect of the Court's disposition of Logan, therefore, is its
willingness to put "bite" into the lowest level of scrutiny and to invali
date a law under an equal protection analysis of the least intensity.
Most recently, the Court has signaled its inclination to apply ra
tionality "with bite" in a case involving the rights of mentally retarded
people to live in residential communities. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Center, the Court considered a zoning regulation
aimed at preventing the establishment of a group home in a residential
neighborhood. 233 The Court refused to find that mentally retarded
people constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class but was concerned
enough about the rights of mentally retarded people to strike down the
law nonetheless. 234
The Court, upon careful review of the record, concluded that it
did not "reveal any rational basis for believing that the [group] home
would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests,"235 and
that the zoning ordinance appeared to rest on no more than "an irra
tional prejudice against the mentally retarded. "236
Such cases as Trimble, Logan, and Cleburne establish that auto
matic deference is not the only alternative under the rational basis tier
of analysis under the equal protection clause. When the Court per
ceives a case close to triggering strict scrutiny, it will pay particular
attention to the state's interests and the ways in which the state action
advances those interests. This note asserts that the right of putative
230. Logan, 455 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
231. Id. at 439.
232. Id. at 443-44 (Powell, J., concurring).
233. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
234. Id. at 3255-56.
235. Id. at 3259.
236. Id. at 3260. Despite its searching review of the record and subsequent invalida
tion of the ordinance, the Court insisted that it was only following established rational basis
doctrine. The dissenters questioned this, stating that the ordinance "surely would be valid
under the traditional rational basis test" and suggesting that the Court actually was apply
ing a heightened level of review. Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
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fathers to establish paternity is just the kind of "close" case in which
application of rational basis "with bite" is appropriate.
In Trimble, Logan, and Cleburne, the Court found neither sus
pect classes nor fundamental rights, but something about the status of
illegitimate children, workers alleging discrimination, and mentally re
tarded people compelled the Court to consider carefully their claims.
That something special, this note asserts, is the proximity of such
groups and their rights to suspect class or fundamental right status.
The cases merit heightened review because, in Justice Marshall's
words, their interests are of particular "constitutional and societal im
portance." The Constitution and society have traditionally accorded
the utmost protection to children, workers suffering from discrimina
tion, and mentally retarded people. On the other hand, the purely
economic interests of such groups as opticians are not considered of
particular import, and thus the Court has had no trouble deferring to
the legislative judgment in those cases. 237
Putative fathers and their interests in establishing paternity are
more like the groups and interests protected in Trimble, Logan, and
Cleburne than they are like those interests at stake in the cases in
which the Court has found it easy to defer. Even if establishing pater
nity is not a fundamental right, it is closer to a fundamental right than
to a purely economic interest. The interest of a putative father in
proving that he is the father of a child implicates human values, family
values, and privacy values-all values that society and the Constitu
tion have historically found significant. Like Trimble, Logan, and
Cleburne, P.B. C is just the kind of close case in which the Court must
do more than simply defer.
When carefully considering the interests of Massachusetts in dis
allowing a putative father to prove paternity, the Court will look at
factors similar to those discussed in Part V of this note. 238 For the
same reasons that the irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy does not
survive strict scrutiny, it will also not satisfy a rational basis "with
bite" analysis. In essence, Massachusetts has failed to demonstrate a
rational relationship between disallowing a putative father's attempts
to prove paternity and the state's goals of ensuring support for chil
dren or protecting family harmony; nor has it established the validity
of a policy of preferring legitimacy over illegitimacy. For these rea
sons, the state's denial of a putative father's attempt to prove paternity
237. See supra text accompanying notes 207-210.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 167-205.
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must be struck down under the appropriate level of rational basis
review.
VII.

CONCLUSION

A putative father's right to establish paternity is a fundamental
right. Because Massachusetts classifies fathers in such a way as to bur
den that right, without state interests sufficient to overcome that bur
den under either a strict scrutiny or a rational basis analysis, the
classification scheme is unconstitutional. The presumption of legiti
macy may therefore not constitutionally stand in the way of a putative
father's efforts to prove that he is the father of a child.
When a married woman conceives and bears the child of a man
who, though not her husband, is willing to shoulder the responsibili
ties of fatherhood, the court should not apply a rigid presumption of
paternity in the mother's husband to foreclose the putative father's
opportunity to establish paternity. The application of that presump
tion both violates the putative father's constitutional right to equal
protection and severely undercuts the newly emerging role of men as
full and equal parents in our society.
Susan J. Barnes

